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II Q. Do you have an opinion at that time whether she was 
2 able to safely operate her vehicle? You can just say "yes" or 
3 "no" to that. Do you have an opinion? 
4 A. Yes, I do. 
5 Q. What is your opinion? 
6 A . I don't believe she was safe to operate a motor 
7 vehicle. 
8 Q. Did you ask her to give a fluidd sample, a urine 
9 sample? 
10 A. I did. 
11 Q. Have you had that tested? 
12 A. I did. 
13 Q. We've shown Mr. Schultz the results of a toxicology 
14 report. Rather than ask it be admitted into evidence, can you 
15 tell me, was this done by the State Crime Lab? 
16 A. It's actually sent to I believe the U of U, their 
17 toxicology department. 
18 Q. What was the result of that? 
19 A. Positive for methamphetamme. 
20 Q. And this is from Ms. Althoff? 
21 A. Yes. 
22 Q. Officer, have you had drug cases where people have 
23 had methamphetamme that you believe to be for personal use? 
24 A. Yes. 
25 Q. And can you tell me about the quantity and how 
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1 packaged, how it's kept when it's in that condition? 
2 A. Usually when it's for personal use it's like that 
3 first baggie I found that was on the console. That's pretty 
4 common. Small, small amounts in a small bag. 
5 Q. You have charged her with possession with intent to 
6 distribute. Why do you feel like this is a distribution case? 
7 A. The scales that I believe were used are for drugs. 
8 The plastic bags for packaging the 31.2 grams or 1.1 ounces of 
9 meth in the small — in the bag that was found in the passenger 
10 door. That's a quantity that's saleable, and with the scale 
11 and the baggies, I believe that's for distribution. 
12 Q. What is the — she took credit for the baggies and the 
13 scale. Is that the — she said that was hers, the stuff in the 
14 box? 
15 A. She said the meth was hers and that Kevin didn't know 
16 anything about it. 
17 Q. Okay. Did anybody take credit for the possession or 
18 ownership or knowledge of that ownership of the stuff, the 
19 scale and the baggies in the wooden box? 
20 A. I don't believe so. 
21 Q. What about the snort tube? 
22 A. Officer Adair told me that Kevin Rothlisberger took 
23 credit for that. Said his ex-wife had given it to him or 
24 something like that sometime before. 
25 Q. Were you able to verify that Ms. Althoff did not have 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
THOMAS KEVIN ROTHLISBERGER, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20030494-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Defendant appeals a judgment and conviction of possession of a controlled 
substance with intent to distribute, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 58-37-8(1 )(A)(iii) (2003), and possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B 
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5(i) (2003), the Honorable Lyle 
R. Anderson presiding. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2)(e) (2002). 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Issue 1: Was the trial court within its discretion in allowing testimony from one of 
the arresting officers concerning general practices in the drug trade? 
Standard of Review: A trial court's ruling concerning the admissibility of opinion 
testimony is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Perkins v. Fit-Well Artificial 
Limb Co., 514 P.2d 811, 812 (Utah 1973) ("The trial judge is allowed a wide discretion in 
his control over the examination of witnesses - lay and expert alike"). 
Issue 2: Was the evidence of defendant's guilt (1) believable as to each element of 
of possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine (2) sufficient to convict 
defendant of the offense? 
Standard of Review: A trial court's ruling on a motion for a directed verdict is a 
question of law reviewed for correctness. State v. Taylor, 884 P.2d 1293, 1296 (Utah 
App. 1994). The analysis is essentially the same used when reviewing a jury verdict. 
State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, f 40, 70 P.3d 111. A motion for a directed verdict should 
only be granted if the State has failed to produce "believable evidence" of all the elements 
of the crime charged. Id ''A jury conviction is reversed for insufficient evidence only 
when the evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that 
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed 
the crime of which he was convicted." State v. Salas, 820 P.2d 1386, 1387 (Utah 
App. 1991) (quoting State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141, 1147 (Utah 1989)). 
Issue 3: Did the prosecutor's closing argument accurately state Utah law? 
Standard of Review: In reviewing a properly preserved claim of prosecutorial 
misconduct based on alleged misstatements, '"the statements] must be viewed in light of 
the totality of the evidence presented at trial. Further, because the trial court is in the best 
position to determine the impact of a statement upon the proceedings, its rulings . . . will 
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not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion/" State v. Longshaw, 961 P.2d 925, 927 
(Utah App. 1998) (quoting State v. Cummins, 839 P.2d 848, 852 (Utah App.1992)). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RULES 
The following statutes are relevant to this appeal and reproduced in full in 
Addendum A: 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5(l) (2003); 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-2(1 )(dd) (Supp. 2003); 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1 )(A)(iii) (2003); 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13(4)(a) (1995); 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13 (2003); 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202 (2003). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was arrested following a traffic stop in Monticello, Utah, on September 
23, 2002. See Transcript of Jury Trial, dated February 11, 2003 ("Tr.), at 54.' On 
September 26, 2002, he was charged by information with one count of possession of a 
controlled substance (methamphetamine) with intent to distribute, a second degree felony, 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(l)(a)(iii) (2003), and possession of drug 
1
 The Trial Transcript is cited as "Tr." because it is a copy of the transcript 
prepared for the appeal of co-defendant Tonya Althoff, case no. 20030373-CA. 
Defendant and Althoff were tried together. This Court incorporated the Althoff transcript 
into the record upon motion by defendant. See Order, dated December 18, 2003. 
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paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5(l) 
(2003). Following a one-day jury trial, defendant was convicted of both counts. R. 90. 
On May 19, 2003, defendant received a suspended one-to-15-year prison term, 12 months 
in jail, a fine of $925 and 36 months probation. R. 115-17. Defendant timely appealed. 
R. 118. Defendant's probation was revoked in July 2003 because he failed to enter into 
an agreement with Adult Probation and Parole, in violation of his probation conditions. 
R. 157, 198-99. As a result, defendant was sent to the Utah State Prison to serve his 
original one-to-15 year sentence. R. 198-99. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Not a good day 
September 24, 2002, was not a good day for defendant and his companion, Tonya 
Althoff ("Althoff'). While returning from Arizona, the two attracted the attention of 
Monticello Police Officer Jim Eberling, who observed their car swerving and changing 
lanes erratically. Tr. at 50. When the vehicle stopped on the side of the road, Eberling 
pulled up behind and asked the driver, Althoff, if anything was wrong. She explained that 
she had been driving a long time and was tired. Tr. at 51. Officer Eberling allowed her 
to leave, but stopped her again almost immediately after learning that the plates on the car 
had expired. Id. She was arrested when Officer Eberling discovered her driver's license 
had been suspended. Tr. at 52. The situation went from bad to worse for Althoff and 
defendant when officers searched the vehicle and discovered two baggies of 
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methamphetamine, scales and a device used for storing and ingesting methamphetamine 
called a snort tube. Tr. at 53-56. Both the snort tube was covered with a white residue 
later identified as methamphetamine. Tr. at 62. 
An amicable arrest 
Following their arrest, defendant and Althoff were highly cooperative, 
volunteering information about their use and purchasing of methamphetamine. 
Defendant admitted he had used methamphetamine earlier in the day and that discovered 
in the search belonged to him. Tr. at 87-88. The snort tube had methamphetamine 
residue. Althoff, too, was forthcoming, acknowledging the methamphetamine had been 
purchased in Bluff, Utah, that she had used methamphetamine earlier in the day and that 
she generally uses it twice a day. Tr. at 69, 89. She also stated that the gym bag 
containing the scales and baggies belonged to her. Tr. at 69. 
Despite their candor, they did not volunteer the location of the drugs, which 
officers had to discover on their own. The first baggy containing a small amount of 
methamphetamine was quickly discovered in plain view between the driver and passenger 
seats. Tr. at 53-54. Eberling also found a gym bag in the back seat of the car that 
contained drug scales, which were covered with a white residue, and several baggies. Tr. 
at 59. A second baggy of methamphetamine was discovered by Monticello Police Chief 
Kent Adair, who, after arriving to assist in the arrest, observed that defendant acted very 
nervous while Officer Eberling searched the front passenger seat. Tr. at 83, 85. 
5 
*1 went over and told Jim - Officer Eberling - that whatever he was looking for 
was in the front passenger seat," Chief Adair recalled. Tr. at 85. 
Chief Adair discovered the second baggy inside a toilet paper roll hidden 
underneath a pair of men's pants that had been stuffed into the door panel on the 
passenger's side of the car. Tr. at 84-85. Analysis later determined the baggy contained 
32 grams of methamphetamine. Tr. at 58, 100. 
With the discovery of these additional items, defendants resumed their candid 
acknowledgment of culpability. Defendant admitted the pants and the snort tube 
discovered in the pocket were his. Tr. at 97. Defendant told Chief Adair, "T got that [the 
device] - I've had that or I got that in my divorce,' or Tve had that since my divorce.'" 
Tr. at 87. Althoff claimed that all of the "crystal meth" was hers and that defendant 
knew nothing about it. Tr. at 61. 
Preliminary Hearing 
Both officers testified at defendant's and Althoff s preliminary hearing. See R. 
214 (Transcript of Preliminary Hearing, held December 2, 2002 ). After testifying to the 
events up to and including the arrest and search, Eberling was asked whether, in his 
opinion, the drugs found in the car were for personal use or for distribution. R. 214:18-
19. 
[MR. HALLS]: Officer, have you had drug cases where 




Q. And can you tell me about the quantity and how 
packaged, how it's kept when it's in that condition? 
A. Usually when it's for personal use it's like that first 
baggy I found that was on the console. That's pretty 
common. Small, small amounts in a small bag. 
Q. You have charged her [Althoff] with possession with 
the intent to distribute. Why do you feel like this is a 
distribution case? 
A. The scales that I believe were used are for drugs. The 
plastic bags for packaging the 31-2 grams of 1.1 ounces of 
meth in the small - in the bag that was found in the passenger 
door. That's a quantity that's saleable, and with the scale and 
the baggies, I believe that's for distribution. 
Id. This testimony was admitted without objection. Id. 
Trial 
At trial, Officer Eberling and Chief Adair again testified about the bust and the 
significance of the quantity found in the car. Testimony concerning the significance of 
the quantities of methamphetamine was first elicited by defendant during cross-
examination of Officer Eberling. 
[MS. REILLY]: I believe, if I can go back, Exhibit No. 1 right here 
was what you found on the console, right? 
[OFFICER EBERLING]: Yes. 
Q. That was with a small amount? 
A. Uh-huh.. 
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Q. Is that characteristic of what's sold? 
A. Yes. 
Q. It is. What - I mean you testified you believed it was for sale 
(inaudible). Do you know how many (inaudible)? 
A. I don' t-
Tr. at 64. 
Chief Adair commented generally on the significance of quantities of 
methamphetamine. 
[MR. HALLS]: Chief Adair, have you had an occasion in 
your experience to look or see how methamphetamine is 
usually packaged as far as - when you have found 
methamphetamine in your experience (inaudible) have you 
found times when people have had personal use amounts? 
A. Yes. 
Q. How is it usually packaged or what is the quantity? 
A. A quarter or half grams [sic], right in there. Maybe 
even at the most a gram. . .. 
Q. Do you have -- through your training and experience, 
do you know commonly what somebody would buy if they 
were to go out on the street buy some right now, what would 
they usually get for personal use? . . . 
A. In our undercover investigations when we buy from 
individuals, we usually buy a quarter or a half a gram. 
Q. Have you ever found in your experience that someone 
who had personal quantities of methamphetamine to have 
scales? 
8 
A. It's not common, no. 
Q. Do you know what those kind of items are used for 
other than - have you seen these kinds of baggies where you 
have found methamphetamine? 
A. Yes. . . . It's quite common with methamphetamine, 
cocaine and those drugs in small quantities. You don't see 
that with marijuana. 
Q. Have you ever - have you seen scales like this before? 
A. Yes. 
Q. In what context? 
A. Usually people that have quantities of drugs have 
scales. 
Tr. at 90-92. 
Defense attorneys objected to this testimony, claiming it was "expert testimony" 
under rule 702, Utah Rules of Evidence, and, as such, was improper because the State had 
not given the defense 30 days advance notice, as required by statute.2 Tr. at 104-05. The 
trial court overruled the objection, holding that Chief Adair testified as a "lay witness" 
under rule 701, Utah Rules of Evidence, which allows opinion testimony that "would be 
rationally based on his perception, and would be helpful to a clear understanding or 
determination of the facts and issues." Tr. at 105. 
2
 Defense attorneys apparently made this objection during an unrecorded side-bar 
conference, then articulated the basis for the objection later outside the presence of the 
jury. Tr. at 90, 104-08. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Point I: The trial court correctly admitted Chief Adair's testimony concerning the 
significance of different quantities of drugs. Contrary to defendant's claim that Chief 
Adair testified as an expert, the testimony is more aptly viewed as lay opinion testimony, 
which is admissible under Utah R. Evid. 701, or simply as statements of fact admissible 
without appeal to rules governing opinion testimony. Alternatively, even assuming Chief 
Adair testified as an expert, the notice requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13(1 )(a) 
were met because the same testimony was offered at defendant's preliminary hearing by 
Officer Eberling. Finally, even assuming the testimony was improperly admitted, 
defendant cannot show prejudice because Officer Eberling's testimony put defendant on 
notice that such testimony would likely be presented at trial and defendant, thus, had 
ample opportunity to prepare for rebuttal. Defendant's claim of surprise is especially 
hollow given that he opened the door by eliciting testimony from Officer Eberling 
concerning the significance of the quantities of methamphetamine. 
Point II: The trial court properly denied defendant's motion for a directed verdict 
because there was ample evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that defendant 
was guilty of possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute. Defendant's 
admission of drug use and ownership of the snort tube in conjunction with the fact that he 
had ready access to the baggies containing the drugs - one of which was hidden in the 
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passenger side door panel beneath a pair of his pants - all provide sufficient evidence for 
a jury to convict. 
Point III: The prosecutor correctly stated the law of accomplice liability and 
aiding and abetting in his closing argument. Thus, defendant cannot show prosecutorial 
misconduct or that the remarks prejudiced him in any way. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY ADMITTED CHIEF ADAIR'S 
TESTIMONY CONCERNING THE SIGNIFICANCE OF 
DIFFERENT QUANTITIES OF DRUGS. 
A. Chief Adair's Testimony was Either Lay Opinion or 
Statements of Fact; In Either Case, It was not Expert 
Testimony and did not Require 30-days Notice. 
Defendant claims Chief Adair provided expert testimony and that the trial court 
erred in admitting it without the 30 days notice required by Utah law. Aplt. Br. at 16-21. 
8-9.3 "The State's failure to disclose Adair's expert testimony to the defense prior to the 
trial in this matter denied Appellant the ability to plan for an effective cross-examination 
and obtain rebuttal testimony with respect to Adair." Id. at 21. This argument fails. 
3
 Defendant's argument is confusing on this point because he appears to argue that 
the State also violated rule 16, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. However, Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-17-13 governs because it applies specifically to the requirements for disclosure 
of expert testimony. In any event, this claim is unpreserved because defendant did not 
argue at trial that the state violated rule 16. Thus, this claim can only be reversed on a 
showing of plain error. State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993). To demonstrate 
plain error, defendant must show that error occurred, that it was obvious and that it was 
harmftil. Defendant has not made this showing. 
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Under Utah law, a party intending to call an expert witness "shall give notice to the 
opposing party as soon as practicable but not less than 30 days before trial or ten days 
before the hearing:' Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13(l)(a). "If the defendant or the 
prosecution fails to meet the requirements of this section, the opposing party shall be 
entitled to a continuance of the trial or hearing sufficient to allow preparation to meet the 
testimony." Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13Q).4 
First, defendant's argument fails because he did not, by his own admission, 
request a continuance. Under the notice statute, a party is entitled a continuance, but only 
if he asks for one. State v. Perez, 2002 UT App 211, If 41, 52 P.3d 451 ("In the absence 
of a request, the trial court had no duty to order a continuance"). Although defendant's 
trial counsel objected to the introduction of Chief Adair's testimony, he did not request 
the only relief provided for in the statute. Thus, he cannot now fault the court for failing 
to do what he failed to request.5 
4
 The wording of this statute was substantially changed in 2003 to read: ' i f the 
defendant or the prosecution fails to substantially comply with the requirements of this 
section, the opposing party shall, if necessary to prevent substantial prejudice, be entitled 
to a continuance of the trial or hearing sufficient to allow preparation to meet the 
testimony." Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13(4)(a) (emphasis added to highlight new 
language). This version became effective May 5, 2003. 
5
 Defendant attempts to circumvent this procedural barrier by claiming his trial 
counsel was ineffective for failing to move for a continuance. See, e.g., Aplt. Br. at 21-
23. However, as demonstrated below in section I.D., his counsel was not ineffective 
because the court was correct in allowing Adair's testimony and, thus, a request for a 
continuance would have been futile. See, e.g., State v. locono, 725 P.2d 1375, 1378 
(Utah 1986) (failure to make futile objections not ineffective assistance). 
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Second defendant's claim fails because Chief Adair was not testifying as an 
"expert." The Utah Rules of Evidence, like similar rules in virtually every state and 
federal court, recognize two kinds of opinion testimony - expert and lay. Rule 702, 
which applies to expert witnesses, states: 
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge 
will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to 
determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by 
knowledge, skill, experience, training or education may testify 
thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. 
Rule 701 states: 
If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness' 
testimony in the form of opinions or inferences is limited to 
those opinions or inferences which are (a) rationally based on 
the perception of the witness and (b) helpful to a clear 
understanding of the witness' testimony or the determination 
of a fact in issue. 
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized that witnesses who testify about matters 
that may be subject to scientific analysis are not necessarily expert witnesses under Rule 
702. In State v. Ellis, 748 P.2d 188, 190-91 (Utah 1987), the Utah Supreme Court 
reviewed defendant's claim that a security guard who testified that footprints discovered 
outside of a burglarized residence appeared to be the same as those inside. Id at 190. 
The defendant claimed that admission of this testimony was improper because the guard 
did not have the expertise to offer an opinion on the footprints. Id. The Supreme Court 
soundly rejected this claim, holding that: 
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It is difficult to understand how [the guard's] lay testimony in 
the form of an opinion became expert testimony. Simply 
because a question might be capable of scientific 
determination, helpful lay testimony touching on the issue and 
based on personal observation does not become expert 
opinion. It is true that if a question is capable of scientific 
determination, then expert testimony is admissible with 
respect to i t . . . ; however, that does not mean that lay opinion 
testimony is prohibited if the provisions of the evidentiary 
rule are met. 
Id. at 191 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. 
DePer'u 778 F.2d 963, 978 (3rd Cir. 1986) (government witness's testimony concerning 
his understanding of extortion defendant's ambiguous statements is permissible lay 
opinion testimony); Fairley v. State, 2003 WL 22724713, So. 2d , f 16 (Miss.)6 
(police officer's testimony concerning workings of a gun is lay, not expert testimony); 
Harris v. Dist. of Columbia, 601 A.2d 21, 25 (D.C. App. 1991) (police officers may offer 
opinion on intoxication or impairment by drugs without qualifying as an expert); State v. 
Rubio, 798 P.2d 206, 207 (N.M. App. 1990) (cocaine dealer may offer lay opinion 
testimony identifying cocaine and marijuana); see also Chess v. State, 357 S.W.2d 386, 
387-88 (Tex. Cr. App. 1962) (police officer may testify on smell of marijuana without 
being qualified as an expert); Provo City v. Spotts, 861 P.2d 437, 442-43 (Utah App. 
1993) (officer may offer lay testimony that substance was marijuana based on "distinctive 
aroma" and defendant's bloodshot eyes and slow speech). 
6
 Westlaw citation pending. 
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Similarly, Chief Adair's testimony, although perhaps amenable to expert treatment, 
was properly admitted as lay opinion testimony. Chief Adair testified that in his personal 
experience those who possess methamphetamine for personal use generally have less than 
a gram. Tr. at 91-92. He also stated that "[u]sually people that have quantities of drugs 
have scales." Id. at 92. These "opinions," if they are such, were "rationally based on the 
perception of the witness and . . . helpful to a clear understanding of the witness' 
testimony or the determination of a fact in issue." Utah R. Evid. 701. Accordingly, the 
trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the testimony. 
Alternatively, Chief Adair's testimony was admissible because his statements were 
not opinions at all, but statements of fact. Indeed, this is the conclusion reached by the 
trial court when asked to reconsider the same issues in a post-trial motion for a certificate 
of probable cause. R. 211-13. "The testimony] actually turned out to be neither expert 
testimony or lay opinion testimony, but merely testimony about Adair's actual 
experiences." R. 212. A number of courts have taken this view of testimony involving 
descriptions of the drug trade drawn from law enforcement officers experience. See, e.g, 
United States v. DiMarzo, 80 F.3d 656 (1st Cir. 1996) (law enforcement agent's testimony 
concerning practices within drug trade not opinion testimony); United States v. Kayne, 90 
F.3d 7, 12 (1st Cir. 1996) ("This testimony was not opinion testimony at all, but a simple 
recitation of an observed phenomenon: the price paid for the coins"); Davenport v. 
United States, 197 F.2d 157, 158 (5th Cir. 1952) (officer's testimony concerning item of 
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drug paraphernalia called a "finger stall" "was neither immaterial nor a conclusion. The 
witness was not asked to give his opinion as to the use made or intended to be made of 
the particular finger stall found. In connection with his testimony as to finding it, he was 
asked, and testified, as to the nature and uses of finger stalls as he had observed them in 
his work as a narcotic officer. The answers made were relevant and factual, and it was 
not error to admit them in evidence"). 
In DiMarzo, the investigating agent, like Chief Adair, was one of the arresting 
officers and testified about the "sting" operation resulting in the arrest of defendant and 
others. DiMarzo, 80 F.3d at 658-59. The agent also testified concerning practices in the 
drug trade, such as whether drug crime participants generally carry guns and whether 
innocent observers are invited to drug transactions. Id. at 659. The defendant claimed on 
appeal that this was improperly admitted expert testimony because the prosecutors had 
not provided proper notice under the federal rules. Id. The court rejected this contention, 
holding that the agent's testimony 
expressed neither a lay nor an expert opinion, as distinguished 
from a statement of fact as to what [the agent] had witnessed 
during his 29 years in law enforcement. As the challenged 
testimony proffered no opinion, lay or expert, but simply the 
witness's personal experience relating to a subject bearing 
directly upon the appropriateness of a jury inference,... we 
reject the claim. 
Id. at 659-60 (internal citations omitted; emphasis in original). 
Chief Adair similarly drew on his 20 years of law enforcement experience in 
noting that those who possess methamphetamine for personal use usually have less than a 
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gram and generally do not have scales. Chief Adair never took the additional step of 
opining that because of his experience, he believes that defendant possessed the drugs 
with intent to distribute. In short, Chief Adair offered no opinion on the significance of 
the quantities of methamphetamine possessed by defendant. Thus, whether viewed as 
opinion or simply statements of fact, Chief Adair's testimony was admissible. 
Defendant's contention that Chief Adair's testimony was expert testimony rests 
principally on United States v. McDonald, 19 F.3d 1519 (10th Cir.), cert, denied, 502 U.S. 
897 (1991). Aplt. Br. at 16-19. In McDonald, an expert testified concerning the 
significance of quantities of "crack" cocaine and how it is sold. Id. at 1521. However, 
McDonald is readily distinguishable because the defendant objected to the testimony, not 
because it was opinion testimony, but because he claimed it was so-called "profile" 
evidence that improperly invaded the province of the jury. McDonald, 19 F.3d at 1521. 
McDonald is also distinguishable because it does not address the question of whether 
such testimony, although admissible through an expert, may also be admitted through a 
lay fact witness, such as Chief Adair. See Ellis, 748 P.2d at 191 ("Simply because a 
question might be capable of scientific determination, helpful lay testimony touching on 
the issue and based on personal observation does not become expert opinion"). Thus, 
McDonald has little, if any, bearing on the issues in this case. 
In sum, Chief Adair's testimony concerning the significance of quantities of 
methamphetamine, whether viewed as lay opinion testimony or statements of fact, was 
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admissible. Accordingly, the State had no obligation to meet the notice requirements of 
Utah Code Ann. §77-17-13. 
B. Even Assuming Chief Adair Offered Expert Testimony, 
Defendant Received Proper Notice Because the Same 
Testimony was Admitted at the Preliminary Hearing. 
Even if defendant is correct in characterizing Chief Adair's comments as expert 
testimony, defendant received proper notice under the statute. Under Utah law, the party 
proposing to use expert testimony must provide notice to the opposing party at least 30 
days before trial. Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13(1 )(a). However, if the same expert 
testimony is provided at the defendant's preliminary hearing, the law deems the notice 
requirements to have been met. Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13(5)(a), states: 
[T]estimony of an expert at a preliminary hearing held 
pursuant to Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
constitutes notice of the expert, the expert's qualifications, 
and a report of the expert's proposed trial testimony as to the 
subject matter testified to by the expert at the preliminary 
hearing. 
The purpose of this rule is clear: To ensure parties have adequate time to prepare 
to rebut expert testimony. State v. Arellano, 964 P.2d 1167, 1167, 1170 (Utah App.1998); 
see also State v. Ortiz, 712 P.2d 218 (Utah 1985). As one court noted: "The general 
purpose of establishing a pretrial sequencing of disclosure for expert testimony is to 
provide parties with adequate notice for purposes of effective cross-examination and an 
opportunity for submission of contradicting evidence-in-chief." Blue Cross and Blue 
Shield of New Jersey, Inc., v. Philip Morris, Inc., etal.9 199 F.R.D. 484, 487 (E.D.N.Y. 
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2001). Moreover, this policy is explicitly embodied in the newest version of the statute, 
which requires only that a party "substantially comply" with its requirements and provides 
for a continuance only "if necessary to prevent substantial prejudice . . . " Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-17-13(4)(a) (effective May 5, 2003). 
The Utah Supreme Court analysis of another notice statute is consistent with this 
principle. In State v. Ortiz, the court reversed a trial court ruling granting the State's 
motion to exclude an alibi witness because the defense had not provided the statutorily 
required notice 10 days before trial. Id., 712 P.2d at 219. The defense had properly 
notified State that there were two alibi witnesses, one of whom would testify at trial, but 
designated a different witness eight days before trial when the original witness could not 
be found. Id. In reversing the trial court, the Supreme Court concluded that there was "no 
basis for concluding that the substitution of Revas for Crisbo would have created any 
unfair surprise or worked any undue hardship on the State. . . . Surely the State knew that 
the alibi witness called by the defense, whether Crisbo or Revas, would corroborate this 
version of the facts." 
Similarly, inReedv. United States, 828 A.2d 159, 163 (D.C. App. 2003), 
prosecutors disclosed the names and qualifications of two possible experts and provided 
extensive background information and details concerning their proposed testimony ten 
months before trial. Reed, 828 A.2d at 161. On the day the expert was to testify, the 
prosecutor informed defense counsel that the expert was not one of the two disclosed 
earlier. Id. at 163. Defendant claimed the substitution of new expert violated the state 
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notice statute. Id. The trial court rejected this challenge and the appellate court affirmed. 
Id. The appellate court noted that the disclosure of the substance of the expert's 
testimony left defendant "well-armed" for cross examination. Id. 
Defendant in this case was equally well-armed for cross examining Chief Adair 
because the same testimony was provided at defendant's preliminary hearing, albeit 
through a different police officer. At defendant's preliminary hearing on December 2, 
2002, both Officer Eberling and Chief Adair testified concerning the events preceding 
defendant's arrest, but only Eberling testified concerning the significance of drug 
quantities. Officer Eberling testified that those who possess methamphetamine for 
personal use generally have "[s]mall, small amounts in a small bag." R. 214:18-19. He 
also testified that, by contrast, the amount seized from the car in which defendant was 
riding - nearly 32 grams - was many times the amount needed for personal use. Id. 
"That's a quantity that's saleable, and with the scale and the baggies, I believe that's for 
distribution." A/.7 
At trial, the State elicited testimony concerning the significance of the amount of 
drugs from Chief Adair. Chief Adair stated that the amount of meth typically possessed 
for personal use is "[a] quarter or half grams, right in there. Maybe even at the most a 
7
 Because Eberling expresses his belief that the quantity indicates defendant 
intended to distribute the drug, his testimony arguably could be considered opinion 
testimony under the analysis outlined in section I.A., above. By contrast, Chief Adair 
never expresses an opinion concerning whether defendant intended to distribute. 
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gram " He also said that those who use meth would have little use for scales. 
"[Pjeople that have quantities of drugs have scales." Tr. at 90, 91-92. 
Because Chief Adair's testimony at trial was substantively identical to Officer 
Eberling's testimony at the preliminary hearing, defendant cannot claim surprise. 
Accordingly, the provisions of the notice statute were met and the admission of Chief 
Adair's testimony was proper. 
C. Any Error in Admitting Chief Adair's Testimony was 
Harmless. 
Even assuming the trial court abused its discretion in admitting Chief Adair's 
testimony, defendant cannot show substantial prejudice. To prevail on his claim, defendant 
must plausibly demonstrate how he would have prevailed if he had received the 30-day 
notice required by statute. State v. Hopkins, 1999 UT 98, f 20, n.3, 989 P.2d 1065. 
Defendant has not and cannot make this showing. Defendant knew from the preliminary 
hearing that he would have to rebut testimony concerning the significance of various 
quantities of drugs. Despite this advance notice, defendant did not request an expert report, a 
curriculum vitae or any other information about Officer Eberling, even though he had every 
right and ample opportunity to do so. Nor did he give notice of calling his own "expert" to 
rebut that testimony. 
Under these circumstances, there is no reason to believe he would have prepared any 
differently if he had known the State planned to introduce this testimony through Chief Adair 
at trial instead Officer Eberling. In short, defendant has not articulated how his preparation 
21 
or cross-examination of Chief Adair would have been any different or produced a different 
result. Accordingly, his claim fails. 
D. Defendant's Trial Counsel was not Ineffective. 
Defendant argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for not requesting a 
continuance to properly prepare to rebut the expert testimony of Chief Adair. Aplt. Br. at 21-
23. Defendant has not and cannot demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel. The 
standard of proof necessary to prove such a claim is extremely high. To prevail, defendant 
must meet the two-part test established in Strickland v Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), 
and adopted by the courts in Utah. See, e.g., Alvarez v. Galetka, 933 P.2d 987, 989 (Utah 
1997). Defendant must establish that (1) his attorney's performance was deficient and (2) the 
deficient performance prejudiced his defense. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. 
To satisfy the first prong of the Strickland test, defendant must demonstrate that 
counsel's ""representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness." Strickland, 
466 U.S. at 688. This requires a showing that petitioner's attorney made errors so egregious 
that he or she was not functioning as the "counsel'' guaranteed to the defendant by the Sixth 
Amendment. Id,; accord Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 522 (Utah), cert, denied, 115 S. 
Ct. 431 (1994); State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990). 
To meet his burden under the prejudice prong of the Strickland test, petitioner must 
show that he was actually harmed by any alleged deficiencies. To meet this criteria, 
petitioner must demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability that but for counsel's errors, 
the result of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; Dunn, 
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850 P.2d at 1225. The courts have defined a reasonable probability as "a probability 
sufficient to undermine confidence in the reliability of the outcome." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
694. 
Defendant's ineffective assistance claim fails because, as demonstrated above in 
section LA., the court was correct in allowing the testimony and a request for a continuance 
would have been futile. See, e.g., State v. locono, 725 P.2d 1375, 1378 (Utah 1986) (failure 
to make futile objections not ineffective assistance). Thus, the performance of defendant's 
trial counsel did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness. 
Moreover, even assuming defendant's trial counsel performed deficiently, defendant 
suffered no prejudice. If the trial court had barred Chief Adair's testimony or granted a 
continuance, the State could have simply called Officer Eberling, whose "expert" testimony 
clearly would have met the requirements of the notice statute because he testified at the 
preliminary hearing. Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13(5)(a). Thus, the testimony would have 
been admitted in any event and trial counsel's failure to request a continuance made no 
difference. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT. 
Defendant claims the trial court erred in den> ing his motion for a directed verdict 
because in order to convict, "the jury had to indulge an inference upon an inference, or 
inference upon assumption, that could lead to conjecture." Aplt. Br. at 35. Defendant is 
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mistaken. There was ample evidence to justify the court's decision to deny the motion for a 
directed verdict and turn the case over to the jury. 
A trial court's ruling on a motion for a directed verdict is a question of law reviewed 
for correctness. State v. Taylor, 884 P.2d 1293, 1296 (Utah App. 1994). The analysis is 
essentially the same used when reviewing a jury verdict. State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, <[ 
40, 70 P.3d 111. A motion for a directed verdict should only be granted if the State has 
failed to produce "believable evidence" of all the elements of the crime charged. Id "A jury 
conviction is reversed for insufficient evidence only when the evidence, so viewed, is 
sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have 
entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime of which he was 
convicted." State v. Salas, 820 P.2d 1386, 1387 (Utah App. 1991) (quoting State v Johnson, 
774P.2d 1141, 1147 (Utah 1989)). 
Conviction of possession with intent to distribute requires proof of two elements: (1) 
that defendant knowingly and intentionally possessed a controlled substance, and (2) that 
defendant intended to distribute the controlled substance to another. State v Fox, 709 P.2d 
316, 318 (Utah 1985). At trial, the State presented undisputed evidence that: 
• Defendant was a passenger in a car in which officers discovered a 
baggy of methamphetamine in plain view on the console between the driver 
and passenger. 
• Officers discovered an additional 32 grams of methamphetamine 
hidden under a pair of defendant's pants stuffed inside the doorframe on the 
passenger side of the vehicle, a location that was more accessible to defendant 
than to the driver. Tr. at 53-55. 
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• The 32-gram cache was discovered after Chief Adair noticed that 
defendant became very nervous when Officer Eberling was searching the 
passenger side of the vehicle, which strongly suggests defendant knew about 
themeth. Tr. at 85. 
• After removing the pants from the passenger-side door frame, the 
officers discovered a "snort tube'' covered with methamphetamine residue 
inside the pants' pocket. 
• Defendant admitted the snort tube was his. Tr. at 86-87, 97 
• Defendant admitted he had used methamphetamine earlier that day. 
Tr. at 87-88. 
• Those who possess methamphetamine only for personal use generally 
have a gram or less. Tr. at 90-92. 
At minimum, these facts provide direct evidence that defendant knew there was 
methamphetamine in the car, that he had used the drug earlier in the day and that the snort 
tube belonged to him. Additionally, because defendant had ready access to the drugs - both 
the console baggy and the large cache in the sideboard - it is reasonable to infer that he had 
'"both the ability and the intent to exercise dominion and control over the drug."8 State v 
Solas, 820 P.2d 1386, 1388 (Utah App.1991); see also State v. Anderton, 668 P.2d 1258, 
1263-64 (Utah 1983) ("key factual determinations" supporting constructive possession 
include defendant's presence, his access and proximity to drugs in plain view, "mutual use 
and enjoyment of the contraband"and incriminating statements). Finally, because the 
8
 In fact, the physical evidence - the snort tube, the proximity of the drugs, the fact 
that defendant's pants were used for concealment - provides greater support for 
defendant's involvement than for that of Althoff, who did not have ready access to the 
32-gram cache and was not physically linked to any paraphernalia. 
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quantity of methamphetamine is many times what is generally possessed for personal use, it 
was reasonable for the jury to conclude that both defendants were planning on selling it. 
In response to the substantial evidence of his guilt, defendant argues the evidence is 
entirely circumstantial and insufficient to exclude a reasonable alternative hypothesis of 
innocence. Aplt. Br. at 31. "Based on the evidence presented at trial, a reasonable mind 
could easily entertain doubt that Rothlisberger committed the crimes of possession and, 
particularly, possession with intent to distribute." Id. at 33. To support this argument, 
defendant relies heavily on this Court's opinion in State v. Layman, 953 P.2d 782 (Utah App. 
1998) ("Layman T) and the "reasonable alternative hypothesis doctrine." In Layman /, this 
Court reversed a conviction of possession with intent to distribute after determining that there 
was insufficient evidence to establish a nexus between the defendant and drugs discovered in 
a black pouch retrieved from the waistband of a passenger in defendant's vehicle. Id. at 792. 
"Given this pivotal deficiency in the State's case, the circumstantial evidence presented does 
not sufficiently exclude reasonable alternative hypotheses of [the defendant's] innocence." 
Id at 790. 
Defendant's reliance on Layman I is misplaced. First, this case is readily 
distinguishable on its facts. In Layman /, drugs and paraphernalia were discovered in a bag 
tucked into the waistband of a passenger in the vehicle and the State produced no 
unambiguous evidence that defendant was even aware of the bag. Here, by contrast, the 
drugs were in plain view, defendant had ready access to them and the paraphernalia was 
found in defendant's pants. 
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Second, the Court of Appeals' analysis in Layman I was not adopted when the case 
was reviewed on certiorari by the Utah Supreme Court. See State v. Layman, 1999 UT 79, 
985 P.2d 911 ("Layman II"). Although the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeal 
ultimate conclusion, it did so on different grounds. Specifically, the Supreme Court took 
issue with the alternate reasonable hypothesis analysis, finding it "problematic and 
unnecessary/' Id. at f 2. The Supreme Court also disapproved of what it described as a 
mechanical reliance on a list of factors derived from other cases involving unique factual 
scenarios. "The danger is that each factual situation will lead the appellate courts to set out a 
new list of factors, and succeeding appellate and trial courts will come to rely on those 
factors as amounting to a checklist of things that must be present if the law's requirements 
are to be met, rather than seeing the factors as only some of the relevant considerations in 
making the underlying determination." Id. at 914. 
Instead, the Supreme Court opted for a simpler and more pragmatic approach. 
According to the court, the fundamental question presented by the case was not whether the 
defendant had possession of drugs discovered in a car. Id. at f 15. Rather, the issue was 
whether the defendant uhad sufficient control over another person to prove constructive 
possession of something that person had in her physical possession." Id. at 1f 16 (emphasis 
added). %tWhen all the brush is cleared, the critical fact is that there was little evidence to 
prove that [defendant] had such control over [the passenger's] person that one could 
reasonably infer beyond a reasonable doubt that he knowingly and intentionally possessed the 
drugs and paraphernalia in her pouch." Id. 
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As the Supreme Court's analysis makes clear, the Layman cases have little if an> 
bearing on this case, which is a "car case." Here, the drugs were not tucked into either 
defendant's pants; rather, the methamphetamine was discovered in the car in places 
accessible to both defendants. Evidence connecting defendant with the drugs and the 
paraphernalia is ample and more than sufficient to support the verdict. Thus, defendant's 
insufficiency claim fails. 
III. THE PROSECUTOR DID NOT MISSTATE THE LAW; 
ALTERNATIVELY, DEFENDANT SUFFERED NO 
PREJUDICE. 
Defendant claims the prosecutor misstated the law in his closing argument. Aplt. Br. 
at 43 (citing Tr. at 151). This claim is meritless because the prosecutor correctly stated the 
applicable law. Even assuming for the purposes of argument that some of his remarks, when 
taken out of context, are inaccurate, defendant was not prejudiced. 
This Court will reverse based on prosecutorial misconduct only when defendant has 
shown (1) "the actions or remarks of [prosecuting] counsel call to the attention of the jury a 
matter it would not be justified in considering in determining its verdict" and, (2) "'under the 
circumstances of the particular case . . . the error is substantial and prejudicial such that there 
is a reasonable likelihood that, in its absence, there would have been a more favorable result. 
. . ." State v. Longshaw, 961 P.2d 925, 928 (Utah App. 1998) (citation omitted). 
Defendant's claim of prosecutorial misconduct should be rejected, in part because he 
cannot demonstrate prejudice. During closing argument, the prosecutor stated: ' i f I drive 
the car with people with drugs in it and I know the drugs are in there, I'm guilty of 
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possession, the same as they." Tr. at 151. Defendant objected, claiming this was a 
misstatement of the law. As shown below, the trial court correctly overruled the objection. 
But even assuming for the sake of argument that the prosecutor's statement was inaccurate, 
defendant clearly was not prejudiced because he was the passenger in the vehicle, not the 
driver. 
More generally, defendant's argument fails because the comments he challenges are 
taken out of context to create a misleading interpretation of the prosecutor's closing 
argument. In fact, the bulk of the prosecutor's remarks were aimed at marshaling the 
evidence that demonstrated Althoff and defendant were jointly culpable because they both 
possessed the methamphetamine with intent to distribute it Tr. at 143-51. Then, toward the 
conclusion of his argument, the prosecutor turned to alternative theories of liability and 
correctly explained that defendant may also be convicted as an accessory or for aiding and 
abetting Althoff. Tr. at 151-52. 
[MR. HALLS]: Ladies and gentlemen, I would like to take the rest of 
my time - one other thing before I sit down. A person can be held responsible 
for a crime when they aid or assist somebody else in committing it. If it were 
hers [Althoff s] and hers alone and that's what you find, if he knowingly 
hauled it for her, if he knowingly helped her conceal it, then that is considered 
to be under your instruction No. 7, encouraging or intentionally aiding another 
person. 
If I drive the car with people with drugs in it and I know the drugs are in 
there, I'm guilty of possession, the same as they. 
Tr. at 151. At this point, defense counsel objected. The trial court overruled, but the 
prosecutor went on to explain that he was merely summarizing jury instructions 6 and 7 -
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instructions which were included without objection from either defendant. See R. at 80-8_;" 
Tr. at 115-25. 
MR HALLS: "A person who encourages or aids another person to 
engage in conduct which constitutes an offense is criminally liable [as a party] 
for the same conduct." That's your instruction No. 7. 
Your instruction No. 6 says something kind of similar. ["]Ifs not 
required that a person be shown to have individually possessed or used a 
controlled substance . . . but it is sufficient if it is shown that the person jointly 
participated with one or more persons in the use, possession or control." That's 
accomplice liability. 
That means if he [Rothlisberger] knew, and you have many indications 
that he knew it was there, even though she's taking credit for it, you don't have 
to believe that that was the truth when she yells out, "That's just mine." 
You can find that he knew it was there. If you do, ladies and gentlemen, 
you can find Mr. Rothl[i]sberger guilty of possession with intent to distribute. 
You can find her guilty of the same thing. I think you can do that without 
having to resort to either one of these instructions. 
But if you - if that doesn't make you comfortable, then you should say, 
"Well, but if he aided and assisted her or knew that she was doing this, or he 
knew she was participating in this, you can still find him guilty under that 
theory. 
Tr.at 152-53. 
Taken in context, the prosecutor's comments accurately state the applicable law. The 
prosecutor first urged the jury to convict defendant as charged based on the ample evidence 
that he knowingly possessed methamphetamine with intent to distribute. Alternatively, the 
prosecutor argued defendant could be convicted as an accomplice - someone who "jointly 
9
 Here, the State refers to page 80 and the page immediately following, which is 
not numbered. 
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participated with one or more persons in the use, possession, or control of any substances 
with knowledge that the activity was occurring, or the controlled substance is found in a 
place or under circumstances indicating that the person had the ability and the intent to 
exercise dominion and control over it"10 - or as an aider and abettor - someone who "act[s] 
with the mental state required for the commission of an offense who directly commits the 
offense, who solicits, requests, commands, encourages, or intentionally another person to 
engage in conduct which constitutes an offense .. ."n These comments do not, as defendant 
claims, suggest to the jury that defendant's mere presence in the car is sufficient to convict. 
Nor do they suggest defendant can be convicted based on mere knowledge that the drugs 
were in the car. Rather, the prosecutor's comments, viewed in context, accurately convey to 
the jury the State's contention that defendant was not just a bystander, that he knowingly 
possessed quantities of methamphetamine large enough for distribution or that he aided and 
abetted in possession with intent to distribute. 
Finally, even assuming the prosecutor's remarks were in some way inaccurate, the jury 
instructions, which neither party objected to, accurately state the applicable law. See, e.g., 
State v. Hopkins, 782 P.2d 475, 479 (Utah 1989) (stating that any impropriety resulting from 
prosecutor's closing-argument remarks was rendered harmless by court's jury instructions). 
Instruction No. 4 states: "Distribute" means the actual, constructive or attempted sale, 
transfer, delivery or dispensing of a controlled substance." Instruction No. 5 gives jurors the 
10
 Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-2(l)(dd). 
11
 Utah Code Ann. §76-2-202. 
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option of convicting defendant of mere possession upon a showing that defendant knowingly 
possessed the drugs, but did not intend to distribute them. Instruction No. 6 states that "it is 
not required that the person be shown to have individually possessed or used, or controlled 
the substance, but it is sufficient if it is shown that the person jointly participated with one or 
more persons in the use, possession or control of any substance with knowledge that the 
activity was occurring." Finally, Instruction No. 7 makes it clear defendant was not guilty of 
a crime if the jury finds that he was merely present during the commission of a crime by 
another. However, %%[i]f you find beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant solicited, 
requested, commanded, encourage[d] or intentionally aided another in committing any of the 
crimes mentioned in these instructions with the intent that the crime be accomplished and 
carried out, then you may find that defendant guilty of said crime." Thus, even assuming the 
prosecutor misstated the law in his closing argument - which he did not - the jury 
instructions clearly and succinctly state the applicable law. 
In sum, the prosecutor's closing remarks were neither inaccurate nor prejudicial. 
Accordingly, defendant's claims to the contrary are without merit. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests that defendant's conv 
be affirmed. 
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58-3^-5 Unlawful acts. 
(1) It is unlawful for any person to use, or to possess with 
intent to use, drug paraphernalia to plant, propagate, cultivate, 
grew, harvest, manufacture, compound, convert, produce, process, 
prepare, test, analyze, pack, repack, store, contain, conceal, 
inject, ingest, inhale or otherwise introduce a controlled 
substance into the human body in violation of this chapter. Any 
person who violates this subsection is guilty of a class 3 
misdemeanor. 
(2) It is unlawful for any person to deliver, possess with intent 
to deliver, or manufacture with intent to deliver, any dr_:g 
paraphernalia, knowing that the drug paraphernalia will be used to 
plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest, manufacture, compound, 
convert, produce, process, prepare, test, analyze, pack, repack, 
store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale, or otherwise 
introduce a controlled substance into the human body in violation 
of this act. Any person who violates this subsection is guilty of 
a class A misdemeanor. 
;3) Any person 18 years of age or over who delivers drug 
paraphernalia to a person under 18 years of age who is three years 
or more younger than the person making the delivery is guilty of 
a third degree felony. 
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,4; It is unlawful for any person to place in this state m any 
:ewspaper, magazine, handbill, or other publication any 
idvertisement, knowing that the purpose of the advertisement is to 
:romote the sale of drug paraphernalia. Any person who violates 
;nis subsection is guilty of a clas' 3 misdemeanor. 
History: L. 1981, ch. 76, § 5 
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UTAH CODE, 1953 
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CHAPTER 37. CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES 
58-37-2 Definitions. 
(1) As used in this chapter: 
(a) "Administer11 means the direct application of a controlled 
substance, whether by injection, inhalation, ingestion, or any 
other means, to the body of a patient or research subject o2 : 
(I) a practitioner or, in his presence, by his authorized 
agent; or 
(n) the patient or research subject at the direction and in 
the presence of the practitioner. 
(b) "Agent" means an authorized person who acts on behalf of or 
at the direction of a manufacturer, distributor, or 
practitioner but does not include a motor carrier, puolic 
warehouseman, or employee of any of them. 
(c) "Continuing criminal enterprise" means any individual, sole 
proprietorship, partnership, corporation, business trust, 
association, or other legal entity, and any union or groups of 
individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity, and 
includes illicit as well as licit entities created or 
maintained for the purpose of engaging in conduct which 
constitutes the commission of episodes of activity made 
unlawful by Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d, whicn 
episodes are not isolated, but have the same or similar 
purposes, results, participants, victims, methods of 
commission, or otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing 
characteristics. Taken together, the episodes shall demonstrate 
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continuing unlawful conduct and be related either to eacn otner 
or to the enterprise. 
(d) "Control" means to add, remove, or change the placement of 
a drug, substance, or immediate precursor under Section 
58-37-3. 
(e) (i) "Controlled substance" means a drug or substance 
included in Schedules I, II, III, IV, or V of Section 
58-37-4, and also includes a drug or substance induced m 
Schedules I, II, III, IV, or V of the federal Controlled 
Suostances Act, Title II, P.L. 91-513, or any controllea 
substance analog. 
(n) "Controlled substance" does not include: 
(A) distilled spirits, wine, or malt beverages, as those 
terms are defined or used in Title 32A, regarding tobacco 
or food; 
(B) any drug intended for lawful use in the diagnosis, 
cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease m 
man or other animals, which contains ephednne, 
pseudoephedrine, norpseudoephedrine, cr 
phenylpropanolamine if the drug is lawfully purchased, 
sold, transferred, or furnished as an over-the- counter 
medication without prescription; or 
(C) dietary supplements, vitamins, minerals, herbs, or 
other similar substances including concentrates cr 
extracts, which are not otherwise regulated by law, whicn 
may contain naturally occurring amounts of chemical cr 
substances listed in this chapter, or in rules adopted 
pursuant to Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative 
Rulemaking Act. 
(f) (I) "Controlled substance analog" means a substance the 
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chemical structure of which is substantially similar to tne 
chemical structure of a controlled substance listed m 
Schedules I and II of Section 58-37-4, or in Schedules I and 
II of the federal Controlled Substances Act, Title II, P.L. 
91-513: 
(A) which has a stimulant, depressant, or hallucinogenic 
effect on the central nervous system substantially similar 
to the stimulant, depressant, or hallucinogenic effect or 
the central nervous system of controlled substances in the 
schedules set forth in this subsection; or 
(B) which, with respect to a particular individual, is 
represented or intended to have a stimulant, depressant, 
or hallucinogenic effect on the central nervous system 
substantially similar to the stimulant, depressant, or 
hallucinogenic effect on the central nervous system of 
controlled substances in the schedules set forth in this 
subsection. 
(11) Controlled substance analog does not include: 
(A) a controlled substance currently scheduled in 
Schedules I through V of Section 58-37-4; 
(B) a substance for which there is an approved new arug 
application; 
(C) a substance with respect to which an exemption is in 
effect for investigational use by a particular person 
under Section 505 of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 
U.S.C. 366, to the extent the conduct with respect to the 
substance is permitted by the exemption; or 
(D) any substance to the extent not intended for human 
consumption before an exemption takes effect with respect 
to the substance. 
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(E) Any drug intended for lawful use in the diagnosis, 
cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease m 
man or other animals, which contains ephedrine, 
pseudoephedrine, norpseudoephedrine, or 
phenylpropanolamine if the drug is lawfully purchased, 
sold, transferred, or furnished as an over-the- counter 
medication without prescription. 
(F) Dietary supplements, vitamins, minerals, herbs, or 
other similar substances including concentrates or 
extracts, which are not otherwise regulated by law, which 
may contain naturally occurring amounts of chemical or 
substances listed in this chapter, or in rules adopted 
pursuant to Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative 
Rulemaking Act 
(g) "Conviction" means a determination of guilt by verdict, 
whether jury or bench, or plea, whether guilty or no contest, 
for any offense proscribed by Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 
37c, or 37d, or for any offense under the laws of the United 
States and any other state which, if committed in this state, 
would be an offense under Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 3 
or 37d. 
'h) "Counterfeit substance" means: 
(i) any substance or container or labeling of any substance 
that without authorization bears the trademark, trade name, 
or other identifying mark, imprint, number, device, or any 
likeness of them, of a manufacturer, distributor, or 
dispenser other than the person or persons who in fact 
manufactured, distributed, or dispensed the substance which 
falsely purports to be a controlled substance distributed by, 
any other manufacturer, distributor, or dispenser; or 
(ii) any substance that is represented to be a controlled 
substance. 
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(l) "Deliver" or "delivery" means the actual, constructive, or 
attempted transfer of a controlled substance or a listed 
cnemical, whether or not an agency relationship exists. 
(]) "Department" means the Department of Commerce. 
(k) "Depressant or stimulant substance" means: 
(i) a drug which contains any quantity of barbituric acid or 
any of the salts of barbituric acid; 
(11) a drug which contains any quantity of: 
(A) amphetamine or any of its optical isomers; 
(B) any salt of amphetamine or any salt of an optical 
isomer of amphetamine; or 
(C) any substance which the Secretary of Health and Human 
Services or the Attorney General of the United States 
after investigation has found and by regulation desigratea 
habit-forming because of its stimulant effect on the 
central nervous system; or 
( m ) lysergic acid diethylamide; or 
(IV) any drug which contains any quantity of a substance 
which the Secretary of Health and Human Services or tne 
Attorney General of the United States after investigation has 
found to have, and by regulation designated as having, a 
potential for abuse because of its depressant or stimulant 
effect on the central nervous system or its hallucinogenic 
effect. 
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(1) "Dispense" means the delivery of a controlled substance cy 
a pharmacist to an ultimate user pursuant to the lawful order 
cr prescription of a practitioner, and includes distributing 
to, leaving with, giving away, or disposing of that substance 
as well as the packaging, labeling, or compounding necessary to 
prepare the substance for delivery. 
(m) "Dispenser" means a pharmacist who dispenses a controllea 
substance. 
(n) "Distribute" means to deliver other than by administering 
or dispensing a controlled substance or a listed chemical. 
(o) "Distributor" means a person who distributes controlled 
substances. 
(p) "Drug" means: 
(1) articles recognized in the official United States 
Pharmacopoeia, Official Homeopathic Pharmacopoeia of the 
United States, or Official National Formulary, or any 
supplement to any of them; 
(11) articles intended for use in the diagnosis, cure, 
mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease in man or 
other animals; 
( m ) articles, other than food, intended to affect the 
structure or function of man or other animals; and 
(IV) articles intended for use as a component of any articles 
specified in Subsection (l)(p)(i), (ii), or (lii); but does 
not include devices or their components, parts, or 
accessories. 
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(q) "Drug dependent person" means any individual who unlawfully 
and habitually uses any controlled substance to endanger tre 
public morals, health, safety, or welfare, or who is so 
dependent upon the use of controlled substances as to nave lost 
the power of self-control with reference to his dependency. 
(r) "Food" means: 
(1) any nutrient or substance of plant, mineral, or animal 
origin other than a drug as specified in this chapter, ana 
normally ingested by human beings; and 
(11) foods for special dietary uses as exist by reason of a 
physical, physiological, pathological, or other condition 
including but not limited to the conditions of disease, 
convalescence, pregnancy, lactation, allergy, 
hypersensitivity to food, underweight, and overweight; uses 
for supplying a particular dietary need which exist by reason 
of age including but not limited to the ages of infancy and 
childbirth, and also uses for supplementing and for 
fortifying the ordinary or unusual diet with any vitamin, 
mineral, or other dietary property for use of a food. Any 
particular use of a food is a special dietary use regardless 
of the nutritional purposes. 
(s) "Immediate precursor" means a substance which the Attorney 
General of the United States has found to be, and by regulation 
designated as being, the principal compound used or produced 
primarily for use in the manufacture of a controlled substance, 
or which is an immediate chemical intermediary used or likely 
to be used in the manufacture of a controlled substance, tne 
control of which is necessary to prevent, curtail, or limit the 
manufacture of the controlled substance. 
(t) "Manufacture" means the production, preparation, 
propagation, compounding, or processing of a controlled 
substance, either directly or indirectly by extraction from 
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substances of natural origin, or independently by mea~s of 
chemical synthesis or by a combination of extraction ara 
chemical syntnesis. 
(u) "Manufacturer" includes any person who packages, 
repackages, or labels any container of any controlled 
suostance, except pharmacists who dispense or compound 
prescription orders for delivery to the ultimate consumer. 
(v) "Marijuana" means all species of the genus cannabis and a L 
parts of the genus, whether growing or not; the seeds of it; 
the resin extracted from any part of the plant; and every 
compound, manufacture, salt, derivative, mixture, cr 
preparation of the plant, its seeds, or resin. The term aoes 
not include the mature stalxs of the plant, fioer produced frc^ 
the stalks, oil or cake made from the seeds of the plant, a^y 
other compound, manufacture, salt, derivative, mixture, or 
preparation of the mature stalks, except the resin extractea 
from tnem, fiber, oil or cake, or the sterilized seed of the 
plant which is incapable of germination. Any synthetic 
equivalents of the substances contained in the plant cannabis 
sativa or any other species of the genus cannabis which are 
chemically indistinguishable and pharmacologically active are 
also included. 
(w) "Money" means officially issued com and currency 
United States or any foreign country. 
(x) "Narcotic drug" means any of the following, whetner 
produced directly or indirectly by extraction from substances 
of vegetable origin, or independently by means of chemical 
synthesis, or by a combination of extraction and chemical 
synthesis: 
(1) opium, coca leaves, and opiates; 
(11) a compound, manufacture, salt, derivative, or 
preparation of opium, coca leaves, or opiates; 
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( m ) opium poppy and poppy straw; or 
(IV) a substance, and any compound, manufacture, salt, 
derivative, or preparation of the substance, which is 
chemically identical with any of the substances referred to 
in Subsection (1) (x) (1), (11), or ( m ) , except narcotic drug 
does not include decocainized coca leaves or extracts of coca 
leaves which do not contain cocaine or ecgonme. 
(y) "Negotiable instrument" means documents, containing an 
unconditional promise to pay a sum of money, which are legally 
transferable to another party by endorsement or delivery. 
(z) "Opiate" means any drug or other substance having an 
addiction-forming or addiction-sustaining liability similar to 
morphine or being capable of conversion into a drug having 
addiction-forming or addiction-sustaining liability. 
(aa) "Opium poppy" means the plant of the species papaver 
somniferum L., except the seeds of the plant. 
(bb) "Person" means any corporation, association, partnership, 
trust, other institution or entity or one or more individuals. 
(cc) "Poppy straw" means all parts, except the seeds, of the 
opium poppy, after mowing. 
(dd) "Possession" or "use" means the joint or individual 
ownership, control, occupancy, holding, retaining, belonging, 
maintaining, or the application, inhalation, swallowing, 
injection, or consumption, as distinguished from distribution, 
of controlled substances and includes individual, joint, or 
group possession or use of controlled substances. For a person 
to be a possessor or user of a controlled substance, it is not 
required that he be shown to have individually possessed, used, 
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or controlled the substance, but it is sufficient if it _s 
shown that the person jointly participated with one or rcre 
persons in the use, possession, or control of any substances 
with knowledge that the activity was occurring, or tre 
controlled substance is found in a place or under circumstances 
indicating that the person had the ability and the intent to 
exercise dominion and control over it. 
(ee) "Practitioner" means a physician, dentist, veterinarian, 
pharmacist, scientific investigator, pharmacy, hospital, or 
other person licensed, registered, or otherwise permitted to 
distribute, dispense, conduct research with respect to, 
administer, or use in teaching or chemical analysis a 
controlled substance in the course of professional practice or 
research in this state. 
(ff) "Prescribe" means to issue a prescription orally or in 
writing. 
(gg) "Prescription" means an order issued by a licensed 
practitioner, in the course of that practitioner's professional 
practice, for a controlled substance, other drug, or device 
which it dispenses or administers for use by a patient or an 
animal. The order may be issued by word of mouth, wri:ten 
document, telephone, facsimile transmission, computer, or other 
electronic means of communication as defined by rule. 
ihh) "Production" means the manufacture, planting, cultivation, 
growing, or harvesting of a controlled substance. 
(11) "Securities" means any stocks, bonds, notes, or otner 
evidences of debt or of property. 
ijj) "State" means the state of Utah. 
(kk) "Ultimate user" means any person who lawfully possesses a 
controlled substance for his own use, for the use of a member 
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of his household, or for administration to an animal ownea oy 
him or a member of his household. 
(2) If a term used in this chapter is not defined, the definition 
and terms of Title 76, Utah Criminal Coce, shall apply. 
History: L. 1971, ch. 145, § 2; 1977, ch. 29, § 3; 1979, ch. 12, 
§ 1; 1981, ch. 75, § 1; 1982, ch. 12, § 1; 1987, ch. 190, § 1; 
1989, ch. 50, § 1; 1989, ch. 186, § 1; 1989, ch. 225, § 60; 1991, 
ch. 198, § 1; 1992, ch. 121, § 1; 1994, ch. 132, § 2; 1996, ch. 
170, § 53; 1996, ch. 294, § 1; 1997, ch. 64, § 2; 2003, ch. 131, 
§ 40. 
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58-37-8 Prohibited acts —Penalties. 
(1) Prohibited acts A —Penalties: 
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful 
for any person to knowingly and intentionally: 
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess with 
intent to produce, manufacture, or dispense, a controlled or 
counterfeit substance; 
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to 
agree, consent, offer, or arrange to distribute a controlled 
or counterfeit substance; 
(iii) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance with 
intent to distribute; or 
(iv) engage in a continuing criminal enterprise where: 
(A) the person participates, directs, or engages in conduct 
which results in any violation of any provision of Title 58, 
Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d that is a felony; and 
(B) the violation is a part of a continuing series of two or 
more violations of Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 
37d on separate occasions that are undertaken in concert with 
five or more persons with respect to whom the person occupies 
a position of organizer, supervisor, or any other position of 
management. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (l)(a» 
with respect to: 
(i) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, a controlled 
substance analog, or gammahydroxybutyric acid as listed in 
Schedule III is guilty of a second degree felony and upon a 
second or subsequent conviction is guilty of a first degre 
felony; 
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule III or IV, or 
marijuana, is guilty of a third degree felony, and upon a 
second or subsequent conviction is guilty of a second degree 
felony; or 
(iii) a substance classified in Schedule V is guilty of a 
class A misdemeanor and upon a second or subsequent conviction 
is guilty of a third degree felony. 
(c) Any person who has been convicted of a violation of 
Subsection (l)(a)(ii) or (iii) may be sentenced to 
imprisonment for an indeterminate term as provided by law, but 
if the trier of fact finds a firearm as defined in Section 
76-10-501 was used, carried, or possessed on his person or in 
his immediate possession during the commission or in 
furtherance of the offense, the court shall additionally 
sentence the person convicted for a term of one year to run 
consecutively and not concurrently; and the court may 
additionally sentence the person convicted for an 
indeterminate term not to exceed five years to run 
consecutively and not concurrently. 
(d) Any person convicted of violating Subsection 
(1)(a)(iv) is guilty of a first degree felony punishable by 
imprisonment for an indeterminate term of not less than seven 
years and which may be for life. Imposition or execution of 
the sentence may not be suspended, and the person is not 
eligible for probation. 
(2) Prohibited acts B —Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful: 
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or 
use a controlled substance analog or a controlled substance, 
unless it was obtained under a valid prescription or order, 
directly from a practitioner while acting m the course of m s 
professional practice, or as otherwise authorized oy this 
chapter; 
(:i) for any owner, tenant, licensee, or person in control of 
any building, room, tenement, vehicle, boat, aircraft, or 
other place knowingly and intentionally to permit them to be 
occupied by persons unlawfully possessing, using, or 
distributing controlled substances in any of those locations; 
or 
(in) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess an 
altered or forged prescription or written order for a 
controlled substance. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2) (a) (1) 
with respect to: 
(1) marijuana, if the amount is 100 pounds or more, is guilty 
of a second degree felony; 
(n) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, marijuana, if 
the amount is more than 16 ounces, but less than 100 pounds, 
or a controlled substance analog, is guilty of a third degree 
felony; or 
( m ) marijuana, if the marijuana is not in the form of an 
extracted resin from any part of the plant, and the amount is 
more than one ounce but less than 16 ounces, is guilty of a 
class A misdemeanor. 
(c) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2) (a) (I) 
while inside the exterior boundaries of property occupied by 
any correctional facility as defined in Section 64-13-1 or 
any public jail or other place of confinement shall be 
sentenced to a penalty one degree greater than provided in 
Subsection (2)(b). 
(d) Upon a second or subsequent conviction of possession 
of any controlled substance by a person, that person shall be 
sentenced to a one degree greater penalty than provided in 
this Subsection (2). 
(e) Any person who violates Subsection (2) (a) (I) with 
respect to all other controlled substances not included in 
Subsection (2) ^b) (1), ( n ) , or (in), including less than one 
ounce of marijuana, is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. Upon 
a second conviction the person is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor, and upon a third or subsequent conviction tne 
person is guilty of a third degree felony. 
(f) Any person convicted of violating Subsection 
(2) (a) (n) or (2) (a) (in) is: 
(l) on a first conviction, guilty of a class B misdemeanor; 
(n) on a second conviction, guilty of a class A misdemeanor; 
and 
( m ) on a third or subsequent conviction, guilty of a third 
degree felony. 
(g) A person is subject to the penalties under Subsection 
(4) (c) wno, in an offense not amounting to a violation of 
Section 76-5-207: 
(l) violates Subsection (2) (a) (l) by knowingly and 
intentionally having in his body any measurable amount of a 
controlled substance; and 
(n) operates a motor vehicle as defined in Section 76-5-20"" 
in a negligent manner, causing serious bodily injury as 
defined in Section 76- 1-601 or the death of another. 
(3) Prohibited acts C --Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful for any person knowingly ard 
intentionally: 
(I) to use in the course of the manufacture or distribution of 
a controlled substance a license number which is fictitious, 
revoked, suspended, or issued to another person or, for the 
purpose of obtaining a controlled substance, to assume the 
title of, or represent himself to be, a manufacturer, 
wholesaler, apothecary, physician, dentist, veterinarian, or 
other authorized person; 
(n) to acquire or obtain possession of, to procure or attempt 
to procure the administration of, to obtain a prescription 
for, to prescribe or dispense to any person known to be 
attempting to acquire or obtain possession of, or to procure 
the administration of any controlled substance oy 
misrepresentation or failure by the person to disclose his 
receiving any controlled substance from another source, fraud, 
forgery, deception, suoterfuge, alteration of a prescription 
or written order for a controlled substance, or the use of a 
false name or address; 
( m ) to maKe any false or forged prescription or written 
order for a controlled substance, or to utter the same, or to 
alter any prescription or written order issued cr written 
under the terms of this chapter; or 
(IV) to make, distribute, or possess any punch, die, plate, 
stone, or other thing designed to print, imprint, or reproduce 
the trademark, trade name, or other identifying mark, imprint, 
or device of another or any likeness of any of the foregoing 
upon any drug or container or labeling so as to render any 
drug a counterfeit controlled substance. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (3) (a) is 
guilty of a third degree felony. 
(4) Prohibited acts D --Penalties: 
(a) Notwithstanding other provisions of this section, a 
person not authorized under this chapter who commits any act 
declared to be unlawful under this section, Title 58, Chapter 
37a, Utah Drug Paraphernalia Act, or under Title 58, Chapter 
37b, Imitation Controlled Substances Act, is upon conviction 
subject to the penalties and classifications under tnis 
Subsection (4) if the act is committed: 
d) in a public or private elementary or secondary school or 
on the grounds of any of those schools; 
(n) in a public or private vocational school or postsecondary 
institution or on the grounds of any of those schools or 
institutions; 
( m ) in those portions of any building, park, stadium, or 
other structure or grounds which are, at the time of the act, 
being used for an activity sponsored by or through a school or 
institution under Subsections (4)(a)(i) and ( n ) ; 
(iv) m or on the grounds of a preschool or child-care 
facility; 
(v) in a public park, amusement park, arcade, or recreation 
center; 
(vi) in or on the grounds of a house of worship as defined in 
Section 76- 10-501; 
(vii) in a shopping mall, sports facility, stadium, arena, 
theater, movie house, playhouse, or parking lot or structure 
adjacent thereto; 
(viii) in a public parking lot or structure; 
(ix) within 1,000 feet of any structure, facility, or grounds 
included in Subsections (4)(a)(i) through (viii); or 
(x) in the immediate presence of a person younger than 18 
years of age, regardless of where the act occurs. 
(b) A person convicted under this Subsection (4) is guilty 
of a first degree felony and shall be imprisoned for a term of 
not less than five years if the penalty that would otherwise 
have been established but for this subsection would have 
been a first degree felony. Imposition or execution of the 
sentence may not be suspended, and the person is not eligible 
for probation. 
(c) If the classification that would otherwise have been 
established would have been less than a first degree felony 
but for this Subsection (4), a person convicted under 
Subsection (2) (g) or this Subsection (4) is guilty of one 
degree more than the maximum penalty prescribed for that 
offense. 
(d) It is not a defense to a prosecution under this 
Subsection (4) that the actor mistakenly believed the 
individual to be 18 years of age or older at the time of the 
offense or was unaware of the individual's true age; nor that 
the actor mistakenly believed that the location where the act 
occurred was not as described m Subsection (4) (a) or was 
unaware that the location where the act occurred was as 
described in Subsection (4)(a). 
(5) Any violation of this chapter for which no penalty is 
specified is a class B misdemeanor. 
(6) (a) Any penalty imposed for violation of this section is 
in addition to, and not in lieu of, any civil cr 
administrative penalty or sanction authorized by law. 
(b) Where violation of this chapter violates a federal law 
or the law of another state, conviction or acquittal under 
federal law or the law of another state for the same act is 
a bar to prosecution in this state. 
(7) In any prosecution for a violation of this chapter, 
evidence or proof which shows a person or persons produced, 
manufactured, possessed, distributed, or dispensed a 
controlled substance or substances, is prima facie evidence 
that the person or persons did so with knowledge of the 
character of the substance or substances. 
(8) This section does not prohibit a veterinarian, in good 
faith and in the course of his professional practice only and 
not for humans, from prescribing, dispensing, or administering 
controlled substances or from causing the substances to be 
administered by an assistant or orderly under his direction 
and supervision. 
(9) Civil or criminal liability may not be imposed under 
this section on: 
(a) any person registered under the Controlled Substances 
Act who manufactures, distributes, or possesses an imitation 
controlled substance for use as a placebo or investigational 
new drug by a registered practitioner in the ordinary course 
of professional practice or research; or 
(b) any law enforcement officer acting in the course and 
legitimate scope of his employment. 
(10) If any provision of this chapter, or the application of 
any provision to any person or circumstances, is held invalid, 
the remainder of this chapter shall be given effect without 
the invalid provision or application. 
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77-17-13 Expert testimony generally --Notice requirements. 
(1) (a) If the prosecution or the defense intends to call 
any expert to testify in a felony case at trial or any 
hearing, excluding a preliminary hearing held pursuant to 
Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, the party 
intending to call the expert shall give notice to the 
opposing party as soon as practicable but not less than 30 
days before trial or ten days before the hearing. 
(b) Notice shall include the name and address of the 
expert, the expert's curriculum vitae, and one of the 
following: 
(i) a copy of the expert's report, if one exists; or 
(ii) a written explanation of the expert's proposed 
testimony sufficient to give the opposing party adequate 
notice to prepare to meet the testimony; and 
(iii) a notice that the expert is available to cooperatively 
consult with the opposing party on reasonable notice. 
(c) The party intending to call the expert is 
responsible for any fee charged by the expert for the 
consultation. 
(2) If an expert's anticipated testimony will be based in 
whole or part on the results of any tests or other 
specialized data, the party intending to call the witness 
shall provide to the opposing party the information upon 
request. 
(3) As soon as practicable after receipt of the expert's 
report or the information concerning the expert's proposed 
testimony, the party receiving notice shall provide to the 
other party notice of witnesses whom the party anticipates 
calling to rebut the expert's testimony, including the 
information required under Subsection (l)(b). 
(4) (a) If the defendant or the prosecution fails to 
substantially comply with the requirements of this section, 
the opposing party shall, if necessary to prevent 
substantial prejudice, be entitled to a continuance of the 
trial or hearing sufficient to allow preparation to meet tne 
testimony. 
(b) If the court finds that the failure to comply with 
this section is the result of bad faith on the part of 
any party or attorney, the court shall impose appropriate 
sanctions. The remedy of exclusion of the expert's testimony 
will only apply if the court finds that a party deliberately 
violated the provisions of this section. 
(5) (a) For purposes of this section, testimony of an 
expert at a preliminary hearing held pursuant to Rule 7 of 
the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure constitutes notice of 
the expert, the expert's qualifications, and a report of the 
expert's proposed trial testimony as to the subject matter 
testified to by the expert at the preliminary hearing. 
(b) Upon request, the party who called the expert at the 
preliminary hearing shall provide the opposing party with a 
copy of the expert's curriculum vitae as soon as practicable 
prior to trial or any hearing at which the expert may be 
called as an expert witness. 
(6) This section does not apply to the use of an expert 
who is an employee of the state or its political 
subdivisions, so long as the opposing party is on reasonable 
notice through general discovery that the expert may be 
called as a witness at trial, and the witness is made 
available to cooperatively consult with the opposing party 
upon reasonable notice. 
History: C. 1953, 77-17-13, enacted by L. 1994, ch. 139, § 
3; 1999, ch. 43, § 1; 2003, ch. 290, § 2. 
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Amendment Notes. --The 1999 amendment, effective May 3, 
1999, inserted "held pursuant to Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure" in Subsection (1)(a); divided 
Subsections (1) to (4), adding (a) and (b) designations; 
made two stylistic changes in Subsection (3)(a); and added 
Subsection (5). 
The 2003 amendment, effective May 5, 2003, rewrote 
Subsections (l)(b), (2), and (3); substituted "fails to 
substantially comply with" for "fails to meet" and inserted 
"if necessary to prevent substantial prejudice" in 
Subsection (4)(a); and added the second sentence in 
Subsection (4)(b) and Subsection (6). 
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77-17-13. Expert testimony generally — Notice require-
ments. 
(1) (a) If the prosecution or the defense intends to call any expert to testify 
in a felony case at trial or any hearing, excluding a preliminary hearing, 
the party intending to call the expert shall give notice to the opposing 
party as soon as practicable but not less than 30 days before trial or ten 
days before the hearing. Notice shall include the name and address of the 
expert, the expert's curriculum vitae, and a copy of the expert's report. 
(b) The expert shall prepare a written report relating to the proposed 
testimony. If the expert has not prepared a report or the report does not 
adequately inform concerning the substance of the expert's proposed 
testimony including any opinion and the bases and reasons of that 
opinion, the party intending to call the expert shall provide to the opposing 
party a written explanation of the expert's anticipated testimony sufficient 
to give the opposing party adequate notice to prepare to meet the 
testimony, followed by a copy of any report prepared by the expert when 
available. 
(2) As soon as practicable after receipt of the expert's report, the party 
receiving notice shall provide notice to the other party of witnesses whom the 
party anticipates calling to rebut the expert's testimony, including the name 
and address of any expert witness and the expert's curriculum vitae. If 
available, a report of any rebuttal expert shall be provided. If the rebuttal 
expert has not prepared a report or the report does not adequately inform 
concerning the substance of the expert's proposed testimony, or in the event the 
rebuttal witness is not an expert, the party intending to call the rebuttal 
witness shall provide a written explanation of the witness's anticipated 
rebuttal testimony sufficient to give the opposing party adequate notice to 
prepare to meet the testimony, followed by a copy of any report prepared by any 
rebuttal expert when available. 
(3) If the defendant or the prosecution fails to meet the requirements of this 
section, the opposing party shall be entitled to a continuance of the trial or 
hearing sufficient to allow preparation to meet the testimony. If the court finds 
that the failure to comply with this section is the result of bad faith on the part 
of any party or attorney, the court shall impose appropriate sanctions. 
History: C. 1953, 77-17-13, enacted by L. became effective on May 2, 1994, pursuant to 
1994, ch. 139, § 3. Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1994, ch. 139 
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76-2-202 Criminal responsibility for direct commission of 
offense or for conduct of another. 
Every person, acting with the mental state required for the 
commission of an offense who directly commits the offense, who 
solicits, requests, commands, encourages, or intentionally aids 
another person to engage in conduct which constitutes an offense 
shall be criminally liable as a party for such conduct. 
History: C. 1953, 76-2-202, enacted by L. 1973, ch. 196, § 
76-2-202. 
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